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Labor Relations and the Lawyer t
By

JEAN

S.

BREITENSTEIN *

Since it was announced that I would speak upon the assigned topic, I
I have received numerous suggestions as to what I should or should not discuss. These have covered the full range from an elementary outline to guide
those who have had little experience in the labor field to the idea that I
should present an analysis of some of the highly technical problems that currently confront those who actively engage in counseling large corporations
in labor matters.
The present interest in the soft coal strike has led me to believe that
perhaps a more timely presentation might result from an analysis of some
of the causes of present day labor strife and a discussion of some of the proposed remedies. In arriving at such conclusion I may have been presumptuous.
I fully realize that the subjects are controversial and that many of you may
disagree with me.
First as to the causes. Attention has oft been directed by able writers
to the fact that the United States has existed and progressed under two contradictory philosophies-on the one hand that of political democracy and on
the other that of a capitalistic economy. For many years-until about 1930
-capitalism was in the ascendancy. However, our political democracy demanded the imposition of gradually increasing controls designed to curb the
growing power of big business. These controls took the form of such laws
as the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Anti-trust Act, the act creating the Federal Reserve System, and the Securities Act.
'An address before the Denver Bar Association, Dec. 9, 1946.

*Of the Denver bar.
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The stock market crash of 1929 and the depression which followed
brought to an end the ascendancy of capital. From then organized labor has
assumed powers which have increased with each succeeding year. Labor has
accomplished this through the operation of our system of political democracy.
In rapid succession Congress passed such laws as the Norris-La Guardia Act,
the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The U. S. Supreme
Court, by way of any assist, held in the Hutcheson case that labor unions
were immune from prosecution under the anti-trust laws, in the Thornhill
case that peaceful picketing was a constitutionally protected right, and in the
Darby case that the field of interstate commerce encompassed many matters
previously thought to be the sole concern of the states.
With capital deprived of the weapon of injunction and labor provided
with the protective armoring of collective bargaining, the balance of power
inevitably shifted to organized labor. A friendly national administration did
nothing to discourage the unions in their demands. A change in personnel
of our highest court resulted in decisions removing certain hazards-such as
the fear of anti-trust prosecutions.
The natural result was to create in organized labor a group power, the
like of which had never before confronted the U. S. The expanding unions
pyramided in a manner that far exceeded the holding company activities of
certain capitalists in the 1920's. No longer was there a situation of local
unions dealing with local employers. Industry wide organizations, including
in their membership all employees of the industry contracted with the entire
industry upon the basis of one master contract. When this point was reached,
the unions were in a position to monopolize and to restrain trade in a manner
and to an extent never conceived by the creators of the great business trusts.
There has resulted, in part at least from the causes outlined, a situation
wherein a union dominated by one man can entirely disrupt the economy of
the nation. What are we going to do about it? A great variety of remedies
has been suggested. Let us briefly examine a few of them.
Some people urge the outlawing of all strikes. Such action would seem
to require the simultaneous outlawing of all lockouts. This proposal runs directly contrary to the philosophies under which our country has operated
for over 150 years. The right to strike is a right precious to labor just as the
right to lockout is a right precious to the employer. However, the right to
strike and the right to lockout are relative, not absolute, rights. The interests
of the public transcend either the interests of labor or the interests of capital.
If strikes and lockouts are to be outlawed then some method must be
devised for the settlement of controversies between employers and employees
which are incapable of voluntary agreement. This involves some sort of
compulsory arbitration-that is, some federal agency must be created to perform the functions which during the late war were performed by the War
Labor Board and its various agencies. It is difficult to believe that any who
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adhere to our tradition of a political democracy and a free competitive system can ever agree to compulsory arbitration of such matters as hours, wages
and working conditions. Unless freedom of contract is to be entirely discarded, these fundamental issues must be left to voluntary agreement. Both
labor and management must resist any attempt to delegate to a governmental
agency the power of decision in these matters. If in a period free from a
national emergency such as the late war, a federal bureau can write the ticket
as to wages, hours and working conditions, then we have come to the end of
the road for both free enterprise and organized labor. Instead we have a
collectivist state-call it socialistic, fascistic or what you will.
It may be argued that so far as the so-called natural monopolies are concerned, i. e., industries in which the charges to the consumers are within the
control of some public body, it is essential that the power to strike or lockout
be entirely eliminated. The difficulty is that many industries are just as essential to the public welfare as are those in which the ultimate charges are
completely regulated. The current coal strike is a good example.
The answer would seem to lie in the 6reation of an agency of mediation
or conciliation, to which notices of strikes or lockouts must be given, with
appropriate provisions for that agency to forbid strikes or lockouts until
after a suitable cooling off period during which an impartial investigation
should be made, with adequate provision for publicizing all pertinent facts.
Consideration might further be given to authorizing such board to apply for
an injunction against the threatened strike or lockout in the event the board
should make an appropriate finding that the public interest would be damaged. However, unless our political ideals and philosophies are to be discarded, this power should not extend to the compulsory arbitration of matters affecting wages, hours and working conditions. This must be left to
agreement between the employer and the employees.
Another popular suggestion is that industry wide or area wide strikes
should be prohibited by law. This idea carries with it as a necessary premise
the idea that collective bargaining contracts should not be on a basis of either
an entire industry or an entire area. Such a suggestion runs contrary to a
well developed trend that has existed for many years. Both unions and employers have in recent years joined with other unions and other employers
in an effort to combat the common opposition. Such organization among
the unions is well known to you all. Perhaps the organizations of employers,
because not as well publicized, are not as well known. Here in Denver we
have the Mountain States Employers Council, an organization of the employers in the Rocky Mountain area, which has as its purpose unified action
by industry in dealing with labor. These organized groups of employers are
to a great extent for the benefit of the small employer who individually does
not have the influence or the financial strength to combat strong and well
heeled labor organizations. The big employers can take care of themselves
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to a great extent. But their positions are immeasurably weakened when the
unions are able to obtain concessions from the little fellows who are too weak
to fight and then contend that these concessions should be adopted by the
entire industry. So there is an advantage both to the small and the large
employer in coordinating their activities through organized effort.
Obviously if the right to take concerted action is denied to the unions
it must be denied to the employers. Certainly it is arguable as to whether
or not any ultimate good to the public will result from any prohibition of
industry wide or area wide collective bargaining, strikes or lockouts.
Instead it would seem that the remedy lies in another direction. The
principles of the Sherman Act should be made applicable to combinations
of labor unions and of labor unions and employers. The decision of the
U. S. Supreme Court in the Hutcheson case was based entirely upon the
construction and application of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the
Norris-La Guardia Act. Labor unions have no constitutionally guaranteed
right to monopolize or restrain trade. The existing immunity of labor
unions to prosecutions for combining to create monopolies or to restrain trade
should be removed by Congressional legislation. When this is done, then
the problem of industry or area wide strikes or lockouts will disappear.
Another popular idea is that the closed or union shop should be prohibited by law. Even a cursory analysis of this proposal discloses that it is
no remedy. Contractual recognition of a closed shop, a union shop, a maintenance of membership shop or an open shop means little. They affect only
that tenuous subject of union security. A strike can occur and often in the
past has occurred just as readily in an industry having an open shop contract
as in one having a closed shop contract. And strangely enough there are
employers who take the position that if their business is going to be organized
by a union it is preferable to have a closed or union shop. Certain union
negotiations are made easier. The charge of union discrimination may be
easily denied. And perhaps in some cases the recruiting of new employees
is facilitated. However, most employers take the position that under American political philosophy an employee should be free to join or refrain fro"
joining a union as he may see fit-in other words that union membership.,
must not be a condition of employment. Certainly this principle may not
be denied without at the same time denying the validity of some of our
fundamental concepts of individual rights.
While it would seem that a prohibition of a closed shop is no solution of
the basic problem of labor relations, it is at the same time apparent that the
right to a closed shop is one which should be so circumscribed as to conform
to American ideals. It might well be provided by appropriate legislation that
there may be neither a closed shop nor a maintenance of membership clause
in a labor contract unless four conditions are satisfied, viz:
1. The union must have as members at least 75 percent of those employees sought to be covered by the agreement;

DICTA

2. The agreement must be ratified by at least 60 percent of all such
employees by secret ballot;
3. Any person employed or seeking empolyment must be admitted to
union membership on terms available to at least a majority of the existing
membership; and
4. No person may be deprived of union membership except on written
charges and after a fair hearing.
So much for the closed shop. Let us now turn to another subject of ever
present importance-the right of collective bargaining and what should be
done about the Wagner Act. At this stage it is a waste of words to argue
about the right of collective bargaining. Its general acceptance must be
recognized. The question is thus narrowed to a consideration of what should
be done about the Wagner Act and here again the issue is largely confined
to a discussion of what should be done to equalize the responsibility and power
on both sides of the collective bargaining table. In this probably lies the
best chance for sound and constructive federal labor legislation.
The Wagner Act took a one sided view of the problem. Rights were
created in favor of labor. Employers were prohibited against engaging in
certain practices which were declared to be unfair. No corresponding rights
were recognized in industry and unions were made liable for no unfair practices. In other words, one side was restricted in its activities while the other
was left free to do what it chose. The result should have been apparent
at the time of the enactment of the legislation. But on top of the legislation
itself there has been the administration of the law by the National Labor
Board which has been declared by board members to have been slanted in
favor of labor.
All this adds up to the conclusion that the Wagner Act must be amended
so as to provide some fair and suitable basis for the operation of the recog
nized right of collective bargaining.
The most important aspect of this problem concerns the mutual responsibility of the labor unions and the employers and the mutual enforceability of labor contracts. If such mutuality does not exist, then what good
are the collectively bargained contracts. And let it be noted here that the
problem is not one sided. Much has been said about the lack of responsibility of unions. Consider the other side of the picture. What is a labor
union to do if the employer fails to comply with a contract which does not
contain a provision for arbitration. And what is the labor union to do if the
contract provides for arbitration and the employer refuses to arbitrate. In
many instances it may be that the only effective remedy of the union is to
strike and this in itself may be a violation of the contract. And when you
have a contract breached by each party where do you stand.
The point is that it is just as much in the interest of labor as it is in the
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interest of capital to have mutual responsibility under mutually enforceable
contracts. Several obvious remedies immediately became apparent. A labor
union should be a legal entity capable of suing and being sued. Unions should
be required to file annually public statements showing their assets, liabilities
and officers. But of paramount importance there should be some method of
compulsory arbitration provided either by contract or by appropriate legislation for the settlement of disputes arising under labor contracts. Such an
arbitration should not include the power to either add to or subtract from
the labor contract, but should include the power to construe and apply the
contract and enforce decisions by appropriate methods.
Mutual contract responsibility is not the only subject for consideration
when amendments to the Wagner Act are considered. Secondary boycotts
and jurisdictional strikes should be eliminated. And of primary importance
is the establishment of a code of what constitutes unfair labor practices on
the part of labor unions. The existing law defines unfair labor practices on
the part of employers. Specifically the Wagner Act might well be amended
to provide that it would be an unfair labor practice for a group of employees
or a union to engage in any of the following:
1. A strike, work stoppage or slow down during the cooling off period
preceding a strike or in violation of a collective bargaining contract;
2. Seizure of or damage to property during any labor dispute;
3. Use of such threats of violence as mass picketing, blocking access to a
place of business or interfering with the use of a public highway;
4. Withdrawal of essential maintenance employees in any labor dispute
where the result may be to jeopardize the safety of persons or property;
5. A secondary boycott;
6. A strike or other coercive action to influence employees in their
choice of bargaining representatives;
7. A strike or other coercive action to compel recognition as bargaining
agent by an employer prior to certification as such bargaining agent.
Perhaps other undesirable practices mgiht be added. The list given is
at least explanatory of the type of activity which might well be forbidden to
labor unions.
Other amendments to the Wagner Act worthy of consideration relate to
a redefinitoin of the term employee so as to exclude supervisory employees
and to the safeguarding of the employer's right to free speech. This last
should not be necessary but the position taken by the NLRB and the courts
indicate the desirability of positive legislation. Also if the investigating,
prosecuting and judicial functions of the board are not adequately separated
by the recently enacted administrative practice act, provision might well be
made for their complete independence.
If the revisions suggested are made in the Wagner Act, it would
seem that some sort of a labor court should be created to enforce labor con-
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tracts but not to write labor contracts and determine controversies involving
unfair practices on the part of either employers or employees. For such a
court to be of any value it must be so set up that impartiality, integrity and
high class personnel are assured.
Turning now from the Wagner Act and what can be done to render it
really workable, consideration must be given to the subject of how can labor
be prevented from taking over the functions of management. Some argue
that labor should take over management but I believe we all recognize that
when and if that happens we have come to the end of our established system
of free competitive enterprise. On this question the answer would seem to
lie not in legislation but in a firm stand by management against contractual
encroachments by labor upon the functions and responsibilities of management. If the rules can be clarified so that the government is no longer an
active participant on the union side of the table but merely an umpire,
employers will have a better chance in maintaining their prerogatives. The
representatives of industry may not abdicate their duty and responsibility to
manage the enterprise in which they are engaged. To this end they must
resist the incorporation into labor contracts of clauses designed to weaken
management. I have reference to such matters as mutual consent clauses,
joint committees, unlimited arbitration and seniority provisions which eliminate qualifications and competence. If management supinely yields to labor
on these matters then it does not deserve to manage.
Thus far we have considered the mechanics or procedures of labor relations. One subject of a somewhat different nature should be mentioned.
I refer to the Fair Labor Standards Act. There would seem to be room for
much improvement here. Of great current interest is the June 1946 decision
of the U. S. Supreme Court in the Mt. Clemens Pottery Company case
wherein the portal to portal doctrine was enlarged to the time clock doctrine
with employers held subject to overtime payments for time spent in walking
to the working place and in getting out tools and putting on the equipment
needed for particular tasks. Wage suits aggregating millions of dollars have
resulted from this decision. Without going into detail it would seem that
much thought should be given to amending the Fair Labor Standards Act so
as to eliminate (1) uncertainty as to coverage, (2) uncertainty as to exemptions, (3) uncertainty in meaning of "regular rate," (4) uncertainty in meaning of "work week" and "time worked." These matters are of a highly
technical nature and no good purpose would be served in outlining them in
detail. Suffice it to say that the need for improvement is a real and pressing
need.
The remedies which have been discussed relate in large measure to legislative matters. Herein lies a danger. We cannot expect a cure-all to come
from Congress. No law is any better than its administration. In the final
analysis capital and labor must work out their differences by voluntary agree-
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ment and not under the. compulsion of governmental edict. This requires a
mutual understanding and a mutual recognition of the problems of each. All
this must be done within the framework of our political democracy and of
our capitalistic economy.
To the extent that we as lawyers can assist in such a solution we owe a
definite duty to our profession and to the public. If no solution is found,
then we must reconcile ourselves to some form of collectivist state. And if the
country turns to collectivism what will become of labor unions, employers,
lawyers and bar associations?

Our Returning Lawyer Veterans
J.

HARTLEY MURRAY, major, Judge Advocate General Department, served
from March 1942 to October 1946 in the United States and in Europe. He
was a member of the staff of Mr. Justice Jackson, U. S. Chief Prosecutor at
the Nuremberg trials. He has returned to practice as a member of the firm of
Murray, Baker & Wendelken, Mining Exchange Bldg., Colorado Springs.

Denver Bar Holds Tax Institute
The Denver Bar Association held a very successful tax institute on December 12th and 13th. The afternoon sessions of both days were devoted to
a comprehensive analysis of the proper method of and problems encountered
in the filling out of individual income tax returns. Thomas Girault, Chief
Field Deputy, from the Denver office of the Collector of Internil Revenue,
and John H. Daly and Byron C. Godfrey, special instructors, conducted the
sessions, and the thanks of the Denver lawyers goes to them for their most
excellent presentation of the subject.
In the Thursday evening session, Donald G. Kirk, Assistant Trust
Officer of the Colorado National Bank, gave a very excellent discussion of
income tax problems in an estate or trust, and Louis A. Hellerstein, Denver
lawyer, made an excellent presentation of the problems encountered in the
buying and selling of a business. On Friday evening, T. Raber Taylor, J.
Churchill Owen and Richard Tull, discussed tax problems of incorporation.
The Tax Committee of the Denver Bar Association which arranged the
program are: T. Raber Taylor, chairman, and Albert J. Gould, Stephen H.
Hart, Louise A. Hellerstein, Harry Alexius King, William R. Newcomb and
Richard Tull.

Denver District Judges Assigned
Judge Joseph J. Walsh will be the presiding judge of the civil division
of the Denver District Court in 1947. Judges Henry S. Lindsley and Joseph
E. Cook are assigned to the criminal division at West Side Court. Judge
Robert W. Steele, who has been sitting in the criminal division will return to
Judge Lindsley's division of the civil division.
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A Legislative Pattern for Protection of

Real Estate Titlest
By

EDWIN J. WITTELSHOFER*

During the past year, a syndicate undertook to purchase a piece of
downtown Denver real estate. The preliminary contract having been executed, the seller who had owned the property for more than thirty-five years,
had the abstract of title continued to date and delivered same to the title
examiner for the buyer.
The attorney made a record examination from the original source of
title, and concluded the title was merchantable. Before the deal was finally
concluded, the buyers decided to refinance the loan on the property, and for
that purpose the abstract was delivered to the title attorney for an insurance
company who was to make the new loan. This examiner likewise made a
record examination from the original source of title, and presented his opinion
that the title was not merchantable because of some defects of record prior to
the present ownership. A suit to correct these defects was brought, and the
transaction was completed.
This actual but not unusual episode is presented not in a critical sense,
but because it pointedly brings to mind difficulties of our present procedure
in the transfer of real estate. These are: First, the duplication of effort in
requiring a record examination from the original source of title each time a
property is sold, mortgaged, and nowadays when often leased-this among a
people whose byword throughout the world is efficiency. Second, the
uncertainty of the quality of title.
This seemingly depends on the philosophy of the title examiner. If he
demands 100% theoretical perfection, the title all too often is bad. If he
requires only a present indefeasible title, it usually is good.
Moreover, the philosophical state of mind on any particular day is subject to the circumstances of that day. The lawyer on one day while waiting
for his street car is picked up by the blond next door and driven to his office;
the mail includes a check from a client to cover an account long charged off;
inspection of a pleading he dictated yesterday discloses no mistakes; he examines the abstract, finds a discrepancy in names but immediately decides it is
idem sonans; hurries through a probate proceeding and excuses the mistakes he
finds under the statute relieving against irregularities when conveyance is made
by an executor, or sold pursuant to order of court; skips thru a foreclosure
with both eyes closed because the sheriff's deed has been on record more than
nine years, and declares the title good.
The next day he over-sleeps; misses his street car; reaches in his pocket
"An address before the Colorado Bar Association, Oct. 19, 1946.
*Of the Denver bar; chairman of the Real Estate Standards Committees of the
Colorado and Denver Bar Associations.
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to buy a paper and finds he has a hole through which his change has disappeared. He finally reaches his office, examines the abstract, the same discrepancy in the names -he concludes is not idem sonans because this discrepancy appears in the letter "s" being the terminal letter in the name. The
probate proceeding he cannot pass because no court has defined the meaning
of the word "irregularities" as stated in the statute; the foreclosure proceedings he combs with an eagle eye because. some day the Supreme Court may
change its mind and declare the nine year statute unconstitutional, and so the
title is not merchantable.
Upon such chances of circumstances all too often rest the quality of title.
Mindful of these defects over the years, a pattern for the protection of
titles and the alleviation of technical objections has been woven through legislative and progressive action.
The design thus created rests upon the following:
a. The adoption by the legislature of the curative act of 1927.
b. Innumberable statutes of limitation enacted prior and subsequent to
the before mentioned curative act.
c. The passage of the so-called Torrens System Act.
d. The promulgation of real estate standards by various bar associations
of the state.
A brief consideration of these steps is necessary to express the extent of
our success, the limitations and defects involved, and to give some slight
prophesy of what future steps may be taken to strengthen those links in the
chain of title which in no way makes the title indefeasible but affords opportunity to timid and unpractical lawyers to offer technical objections which
are difficult and costly to correct.
The Curative Act
In 1927 the state legislature passed what is known- as the curative act.
This act is not one solely of limitation, but is also designed to afford a maximum of benefit to those titles which present technical rather than substantive
objections. Each provision of this act is aimed at removing an otherwise
particular weakness in the chain of title.
This curative act is most important for it covers many of the objections
to titles which can only be relieved against by statutory action. Such statutes,
however, can only cover comparatively narrow problems and to become really
effective must be revised from time to time to broaden their scope and bring
them up to date. The method of accomplishing this is too difficult and tortuous to make it a complete or satisfactory answer to the problem.
There is, however, one provision in this curative act which is all too
often overlooked by title examiners when applying remedial statutes to alleviate
defects. This is section 151, chapter 40, 1935 C. S. A., and reads as follows:
"It is the purpose and intention of this article to render titles
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to real property and every interest therein, more secure and marketable, and it is hereby declared to be the policy in this state that this
article and all other acts and laws concerning or affecting title to real
property and every interest therein and all recorded instruments,
decrees and orders of court of record (including all proceedings in
the suits or causes wherein such orders or decrees may have been entered or rendered) shall be liberally construed and with the end in
view of rendering such titles absolute and free from technical defects,
and so that subsequent purchasers and incumbrances by way of mortgage, judgment or otherwise, may rely on the record title, and so that
the record title of the party in possession shall be sustained and not
be defeated by technical or strict constructions."
Professor Aigler of the University of Michigan, in an article recently
appearing in the Michigan State Bar Journal, commenting on this section,
writes, "This may not be good English, but the spirit is highly commendable."
It is important not only as related to the curative act but as expressing
the legislative intent that all acts and laws concerning real property and all
recorded instruments, etc., shall be liberally construed so as to render titles
absolute and free from technical defects. Thus it applies to all statutes of limitation of every kind and character and expresses the will of the people of our
state that a title shall not fail because of technical objections. Our Supreme
Court has also expressed itself in connection with this section. In the opinion
in the Schmidt case,* it said: "Section 151 declares the public policy and purpose of the action to be such that the record title, of the party in possession
shall be sustained and not defeated by technical or strict construction ...
The purpose of this act was to make real estate titles more safe, secure and
marketable. To this end a liberal construction is required ...In interpreting
the act, it is necessary to construe its various sections harmoniously. With
this purpose in mind which undoubtedly expresses the legislative intent we proceed to a consideration of judgment before us."
Here is sure armament for courageous application in the broadest sense of
the provisions, not only of the curative act of 1927, but also of the many
statutes of limitations, and provides safe ground for the promulgation and
realistic use of our title standards.
Statutes of Limitations
The many statutes of limitations enacted over the years provide much
the same benefits and are subject to much the same difficulties as the provisions of the curative act heretofore noted. In addition thereto, our legislature has given birth to these statutes with all the biological urge of guinea
pigs. We have enacted limitation upon limitation, and imposed one statute
*Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Schmidt, 109 Colo. 467.
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upon another. They are to be found attached and inserted in the most unusual manner to an in other statutes which seemingly have no affinity
until one may well say "it is a wise little lien that knows all its limitations."
Again these varied and multitudiness statutes have no rational, practical
or comparative periods as to the limitations imposed. By way of example, an
unreleased deed of trust or mortgage ceases to be a lien after it has remained
of record more than fifteen years subsequent to the due date of the indebtedness secured, unless an extension appears of record. If however, suit is
brought on the indebtedness, judgment obtained, and levy made in aid of
execution, the levy remains a lien for a period of twenty years, but if the
trust deed is foreclosed in accordance with its terms and certificate of purchase
issued, application for the deed pursuant to said certificate must be made
within fifteen months after the issuance of said certificate, or the certificate
ceases to be a lien.
The Torrens System
The Torrens System has been on our statutes books for more than forty
years. It is the method of title transfers in use in many foreign lands in which
property ownership reaches back for many centuries. It has some few ardent
supporters who feel that the transfer of land should be made no more difficult
or expensive than the transfer of an automobile. On the other hand there
are many skeptics. It is quite apparent, however, that the plan has not generally become too useful. Recently a survey financed by a grant from the
Carnegie Foundation recommended against the adoption of the Torrens plan
for the state of New York.
The difficulties arising out of the implimentation of this plan in Colorado is two-fold. First, the initial cost to the owner in registering his land
under this system is too expensive, especially in a state in which so much of
the property ownership is rural. Second, the records necessary for proper registration and the issuance of proper certificates require knowledge, capacity
and ability upon the part of the county clerk and recorder beyond that of the
incumbant in such office in many of the counties in this state.
Stcndcrds of Title
The principal of promulgating and adopting standards of title to give
uniform and conclusive answers to many questions commonly found in titles
has thus far proven to be of inestimable value to the legal fraternity as well
as to their clients. The importance of implementing a plan which presents
uniformity, practicably and good common sense in the formulation of conclusions of lawyers concerning marketability of titles cannot be overestimated.
Much of the difficulty heretofore experienced in title examinations has
arisen from the view point of the lawyer in respect to his duty as a title
examiner. He often fails to realize that he is asked for an opinion as to the
marketability of the title rather than as to its perfection or imperfection. He
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is protected under the law if he has used the care of a usually prudent title
examiner. When on any particular point there is no controlling statute or
specific law in decided cases, the common practice of lawyers in the community
may and should be properly considered in the determination of the marketability of the title. Through the adoption by the bar association of these
standards, he has at hand, so far as the questions covered by the standards are
concerned, the certainty of what that common practice is. Necessarily then,
the failure of his protection comes from his own associates who fail to exercise
an independent judgment in respect to particular irregularities in the title.
The opportunity of affording such protection arises from the promulgation and
operation of standards of title. The success of such a plan depends upon the
backing of the bar as a whole.
In Denver and in other communities where the principal is in operation,
accomplishments of great importance have been obtained. The standards
adopted have been based upon actual problems, all taken from the experiences
of members of the bar; none are hypothetical cases. Some may seem altogether
too simple and to many may appear to be unnecessary, but it must be remembered that what seems negligible in importance to many may appear of great
importance to the few, and through the action of those few become important
to all, and so we must seek to eliminate as many differences as possible, be they
great or small.
In operating this plan, reliances must be had upon the presumption that
lawyers engaged in this branch of labor are reasonably prudent title examiners. If this premise be accepted, it follows, that the standards which are
set up more or less in the form of a code after careful study and investigation
by representatives of the bar association selected for that purpose should and
will be accepted by all title examiners. That they will be given practical
effect by the courts and received in evidence as the common practice of lawyers in their community, I have no doubt, and once in evidence, it will take
considerable temerity upon the part of a lawyer to risk his professional reputation by testifying as an expert witness that those standards cannot be relied
upon and followed by reasonably prudent examiners, especially in this state
wherein the will of the people by legislative action has shown their determination that titles shall not fall upon technical objections.
Notwithstanding the fact that some of the standards which have or hereafter may be set up are based upon no statute or decision of court to sustain
the conclusion, yet this should not defeat their effectiveness or purpose.
Unless and until ultimate decision is rendered they will stand as the common
practice among examiners in their community and can be relied upon with
safety by all title examiners. Other than the fact that these standards apply
only in matters not requiring legislative action, the apparent weakness in the
plan lies in the possible failure of members of the bar generally to support
these standards once they are set up. But so far as they are adopted and relied
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upon, they will to a large extent bring harmony and understanding among
ourselves and between ourselves and the public. It perhaps should again
be emphasized that reliance upon these standards does not involve the assumption of new risks but rather eliminates the constant fear hanging over
the heads of everyone of us.
A review of the benefits in the use of these standards during the past
four years will demonstrate the practicable usefulness and benefit of this
plan.
Suggestions
In concluding, may I offer the following suggestions, not for affirmative
action at this time, but for consideration and study by members of the bar.
1. That a committee be appointed, with needed funds available, to codify
the many statutes of limitations affecting real estate titles, with the end in
view of establishing a rational uniform and workable codification of limitation
statutes.
2. That a committee be appointed to give study and consideration to
such general and all inclusive statutes of limitations as are now incorporated
in the laws of the states of Michigan and Wisconsin, which in effect permit
reliance on record titles covering a period of thirty years prior to date of
transfer.
3. That annually (probably in connection with the yearly convention
of the Colorado Bar Association) a conference be held of delegates of all bar
associations in the state operating under the title standard plan, to co-ordinate
and unify the standards adopted by the various associations to facilitate the
promulgation of further standards, and to discuss ways and means to further
the benefits obtainable from the use of this plan.
4. That effort be made to give effective publicity to the standards
adopted so that all lawyers throughout the state may have ready access to the
standards in use.

Decalogue Society Essay Contest
The Decalogue Society, an organization of more than 1400 lawyers
and jurists of Jewish faith, and devoted to professional and communal
interests, announces an essay contest for students in American law schools
who have finished their first year of law study. The subject is: "With Due
Regard for the Constitutional Guarantees of Freedom of Expression, What
Can Be Done to Protect the Community from Tension and Violence Arising
from Defamation or Abuse of its Minority Groups, Such as Negroes, Catholics and Jews?"
The three prizes are $300, $150 and $50. Manuscripts are to be 1500
to 3500 words. For further information write Benjamin Weintraub, president,
176 W. Adams St., Chicago 3, Illinois.
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Report of the Judiciary Committee
By

PHILIP S. VAN CISE, CHAIRMAN

The Judiciary Committee expects to make a brief monthly report to the
the bar of the progress of its work.
Districts which have completed their final financial quota and their organization by counties are as follows:
Completed

District
Quota
First ...........----------------------------------------------

Completed

Committee
x

Second -------......----------------------------------------x
Third .......................................................
Fourth .......................................................
x
Fifth ........................................................
x
Sixth ---------------------------------------------------------Seventh ----------------------------------------------------x

Eighth .......................................................
x
x
Ninth -------------------------------------------------- x
x
Tenth -----------_-----_.----------------............
x
x
Eleventh ---------------------------------------------------x
Twelfth ------------------------------------------------x
x
Thirteenth -------------------------------------------x
x
Fourteenth -------------------------------------------x
x
Fifteenth ....................................................
x
We are now mailing out to all districts and county chairmen complete
sets of forms to get the data on all the justice courts, county courts--both
county court and juvenile court-and district courts. We originally intended
to get this date for each of the ten years from 1937 through 1946, inclusive,
but decided that task was too great for the funds and force available. Consequently, we are getting this for five of the years instead of the ten, and the
information will be for the years 1938, 1940, 1942, 1944, and 1946.
The committee chairman in each county has a tremendous job in getting
this data and will need all the assistance he can possibly get from other members of the bar. The justice court data will have to be obtained from the
dockets where available, and in most cases where the county judge is not a
lawyer and there is no office force, the county court information will have to
be obtained in the same manner. In the main, in the larger counties and
district courts, this information can be obtained from the clerks.
We need volunteers to help these county chairmen, and we therefore give
you a list of the counties and county chairmen so that you can contact them
and help on this all important job:
Adams, Harry Behm.
Alamosa, Merle Marshall.
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Arapahoe, Earl Hower.
Archuleta, A. M. Emigh (District Chairman).
Baca, Averill C. Johnson (District Chairman).
Bent, Averill C. Johnson (District Chairman).
Boulder, Henry 0. Andrew.
Chaffee, John M. Boyle.
Cheyenne, V. H. Johnson.
Clear Creek, Erl H. Ellis.
Conejos, Fidel Chavez.
Costilla, Raphael Moses.
Crowley, Erven T. Larson.
Custer, Frank G. Stinemeyer.
Delta, Roderick N. Stewart.
Dolores, A. M. Emigh (District Chairman).
Douglas, Harold Senter.
Eagle, Harold A. Grant (District Court Chairman), Charles R. Casey
(County Court Chairman), William J. Meehan (Justice Court Chairman).
Elbert, Harry Anderson.
El Paso, Chester B. Horn.
Fremont, James Harrison Hawthorne.
Garfield, C. H. Darrow.
Gilpin, LeRoy J. Williams.
Grand, James Mosley.
Gunnisoh, Robert G. Porter.
Hinsdale, Mrs. Dorothy Jo French.
Huerfano, Frank H. Hall (District Chairman).
Jackson, Hatfield Chilson.
Jefferson, Emory L. O'Connell.
Kiowa, Averill C. Johnson (District Chairman).
Kit Carson, Thornton H. Thomas, Jr.
Lake, (see Eagle County).
La Plata, A. M. Emigh (District Chairman).
Larimer, John D. Hartman.
Las Animas, Frank H. Hall (District Chairman).
Lincoln, John G. Reid.
Logan, T. E. Munson.
Mesa, Charles M. Holmes.
Mineral, M. T. Hancock.
Moffat, James Mosley.
Montezuma, A. M. Emigh (District Chairman).
Morgan, George Epperson.
Otero, Perry E. Williams (District Court Chairman); Laurence Thulemeyer (County Court Chairman); George S. Cosand (Justice Court Chair,
man).
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Ouray, Jerome Paul.
Park, Foster Cline.
Phillips, Sherman E. Walrod.
Pitkin, C. H. Darrow.
Prowers, Averill C. Johnson (District Chairman).
Pueblo, Laurence E. Langdon (District Court Chairman), Sam Parlapiano (County Court Chairman), John Faricy (Justice Court Chairman).
Rio Blanco, C. H. Darrow.
Rio Grande, Frank Shaw.
Routt, James Mosley.
Saguache, Robert R. Tarbell.
San Juan, A. M. Emigh (District Chairman).
San Miguel, C. N. Fairlamb.
Sedgwick, Richard D. Dittemore.
Summit (see Eagle County)
Teller, Sam Nikkel
Washington, Frank D. Allen.
Weld, M. E. H. Smith.
Yuma, M. M. Bulkeley.
Stanley H. Johnson, the executive secretary, now has his office at room
706 Ernest & Crammer Bldg., Denver, on the same floor as the office of the
Judiciary Committee, which is room 727, CHerry 1384. The executive secretary is in process of analyzing and digesting the Model Judiciary Act and
the Arkansas plan of the American Judicature Society, and will shortly make
a report.
Many lawyers are now sending in their suggestions. We want suggestions and help from all of you.

Upon Information and Belief
A bequest to Colorado University
Mrs. Sadie D. Rogers, who died recently in Denver, left the law school of
Colorado University a bequest of $5,000 for the benefit of the school and law
library, in memory of her late husband, George Rogers, who lived many years
in Boulder.
American Bar Association Meeting
This year's American Bar Association meeting, held in Atlantic City
the last of October, was not quite the full-scale meeting which had been anticipated. Atlantic City is too far geographically from too many places and
too far above the economic standards of too many places to attract many people. However, there was a good registration and Colorado was represented
by her old faithfuls. The breaking out of two new sections-Administrative
Law and Labor Law-adds to the confusion of sections already existing. Tuxes
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were again in evidence at the dinners, but with the price of meals running up
into astronomical figures, the $4.50 dinner of the Judicial Administration Section packed in the crowd. Of course, there were other reasons than the low
(comparative) price. Something new has been added-a five buck registration fee. Just what this fee covered is not clear, because entertainment with,
out cost to the visiting barristers was nowhere in evidence, as it always has
been at American Bar Association meetings in the past. Possibly the outstanding event of the meeting was the Judicial Administration Section dinner.
Chairman Bolitha J. Laws brought together a lawyer-Gov. Earl Warren of
California-and a layman-Dean Elmer L. Kayser of George Washington
University-to tell how the courts and laymen can cooperate in improving
judicial procedures. Those who attended the Colorado Bar Association meet,
ing will recall that Judge Laws proposed then to bring laymen into the field
of improving judicial administration.
The weather was grand and the ocean was beautiful, so if one could
avoid grabbing the check too many times, there was still plenty to enjoy and
be inspired by.
And for those who wish to know what the future holds in store let it be
said that the 1947 meeting will be in Cleveland, where it was last held in
1938, beginning September 22.
Bolitha J. Laws
We first met him at the Colorado Bar Association meeting at Colorado
Springs when he appeared at President Moorhead's breakfast attired in his
golfing togs. He was handsome, pleasant and congenial. Then we saw him at
the luncheon when he made his powerful presentation on the work of improving the administration of justice, and how the layman must now be
brought into the picture. He was fluent, dynamic. His presentation was
interesting and powerful. We next saw him in Atlantic City presiding over
the meetings of the Judicial Administration Section of the American Bar
Association. There he brought a lawyer and a layman together to tell how
the layman can help in improving the administration of justice.

Whenever

we saw him we were attracted by his fine features, his charming manner, and
the trace of a smile which was always on his face. And now, it matters not
that Bolitha J. Laws is Chief Justice of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, or that he is handsome or charming or a good
speaker. What does matter is that Bolitha J. Laws knows and understands
that the layman has a place in improving the administration of justice and
that he, Bolitha J. Laws, is seeing to it that others know and understand
this also.
Orie L. Phillips
Great tribute is paid to Judge Orie L. Phillips by the American Bar As,
sociation Journal in making him the subject of the first article in its series
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about senior circuit judges. The article appears in, and his picture graces
the cover of, the November issue of the Journal. The article gives an outline of his career, and a review of some of his decisions. That Judge Phillips
is a great judge no one in the Tenth Circuit will deny. However, we are
inclined to believe that he was the first senior circuit judge to be written of
in the Journal, not because of his judicial brilliance as much as because of his
long and faithful work in bar associations, working side by side with lawyers
in the betterment of the profession and the improvement of the administration of justice.

Admitted to a Higher Court
SAMUEL G. MCMULLIN, Grand Junction, died on November 15, at the
age of 80, of a heart attack in his home. He leaves surviving him two sons:
Howard H. McMullin, a prominent business man of Grand Junction, and
Bentley M. McMullin, who is now practising law in Denver after his return
from service during the war in the Navy. He was born in Philadelphia July
2, 1866, the son of a Presbyterian minister. He was educated in the office
of his uncle, Stanley Matthews, who later became a Judge of the Supreme
Court, and he also attended the Cincinnati School of Law. With a pioneer
spirit, he went West when he was 23 years of age and came to Grand
Junction in November 1889. He saw Grand Junction grow from an isolated
frontier village to its present status as one of the most modern and progressive of the smaller cities of the West. Mr. McMullin was active and
energetic in developing and building Western Colorado. He was admitted
to the Colorado Bar in 1891 and actively practised as one of the leading
and outstanding attorneys of Western Colorado until 1942 when he retired
to devote his time to his business interests. With Guy V. Sternberg, he
formed a partnership in 1924. This firm continued until 1942 when Mr.
McMullin retired and the present firm of Helman & Younge took over the
practice of the office. Mr. McMullin was instrumental in developing the
oil shale and mining resources of Western Colorado and was interested in
many of the successful irrigation projects.. He helped develop the fruit
industry and particularly the peach industry and the marketing methods now
successfully used. As was well said in the Grand Junction paper: "Samuel
G. McMullin was an able lawyer, a shrewd business man, and a citizen with
undying faith in the community with which he has cast his lot. He was a
man of strong convictions and outspoken in his advocacy of things in which
he believed or in opposition to things with which he was not in sympathy.
As a result, naturally, there were times when his vigorous personality was
not always on the popular side. Truly a Grand Junction pioneer and a
man whose life span embraced five and one-half of the six and one-half
decades of this city's history, Samuel G. McMullin's passing is marked
by sincere regret on the part of the community."
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C. BUTLER, Denver, died at the age of 81 after a short illness.
His death ended a distinguished career, highlight of which was his service on
the Colorado Supreme Court, during which time he earned public recognition
as one of Colorado's ablest judges. He was born in Milwaukee, Wisc., and
studied law at Michigan. He had honorary degrees from Denver and
Colorado Universities. In 1892 he served as deputy district attorney in
Arapahoe County, and then served in the same position in Teller county.
From 1912 to 1926 he was judge of the Denver District Court, and was
then elected to the Colorado Supreme Court to serve for ten years. In
1937-1938, he was assistant District attorney under Denver's new congressman, John A. Carroll. He was a Mason and a life member of Colorado
Historical Society.
CHARLES

OFFICE OF COMMANDANT

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT
SAN FRANCISCO, 2, CALIFORNIA

October 29, 1946.
Colorado Bar Association:
As you no doubt know, the Navy is in the process of setting up a Legal
Specialist branch, composed of officers who have been educated or trained in
the Law. Many Naval Reserve officers who saw active service during World
War II have taken advantage of the opportunity presented by Congress to
transfer to the Regular Navy. It is largely from this group that candidates
for the Legal Specialist branch are being obtained.
Recently, certain changes have been made in the qualification requirements for candidates to the Legal Specialist branch. The previous specific
requirement of a law degree has been modified. A law degree is not now
requisite, provided the applicant has been admitted to practice before the
Bar in any state, territory, or the District of Columbia. Also, the time limit
previously set for the submission of applications for transfer to the Regular
Navy as a legal specialist has been extended.
This information is sent to you with the request that it be disseminated
among your members by publication in your Association periodical, as appropriate, for the benefit of your members who served in the Navy during
the war, and to whom the information set out above may be of immediate
personal interest.
Very truly yours,
L. J. JOHNS,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Legal Officer.
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Lawyers in the Public Service
governor-elect, heads the long list of lawyers elected
to public office in Colorado at this year's election. WILBUR M. ALTER,
FRANK L. HAYS and GEORGE A. LUXFORD were elected to the Supreme Court.
H. LAWRENCE HINKLEY was re-elected Attorney General. ROBERT D.
WILLIAM LEE KNOUS,

CHARLTON and RALPH L. CARR were elected regents of Colorado Univer-

sity. JOHN A. CARROLL was elected to Congress from Denver and J. EDGAR
CHENOWETH was re-elected to Congress from southern Colorado. Lawyer
members elected to the state senate are CLAUDE W. BLAKE, ARTHUR H. LAWS,
SAM T. TAYLOR, WAYNE N. ASPINALL, ROBERT A. THEOBALD and
AVERILL C. JOHNSON.

(Three holdover lawyer-senators bring the number

of lawyers in the senate to nine.)

Lawyers members of the house will be

LYMAN P. WELD, V. H. JOHNSON, MILTON J. BLAKE, CLEM CROWLEY,
OTIS J. GIBSON, LAWRENCE M. HENRY, JAMES B. RADETSKY, ROBERT S.
GAST, JR., WILLIAM ALBION CARLSON and CHARLES C. TOWNSEND.

HENRY W. TOLL, Denver, has been elected secretary of the Colorado Division

of the American Cancer Society.
PHILLIP B. GILLIAM, judge of the Denver Juvenile Court, has been elected

vice-president of the National Conference of Juvenile Agencies. He is also
a member of the International Kiwanis committee for Underprivileged Children and vice-president of the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
WILLIAM F. McGLONE has been re-elected president of the Denver Public
Health Council. HUBERT D. HENRY has been elected vice-president.
BRIG. GEN. STANFORD W. GREGORY, Denver, has been appointed commanding

officer of the 59th Fighter Wing, Colorado National Guard.
ROBERT D. CHARLTON, Denver, has been selected to command the ground

forces of the Colorado National Guard.
SYDNEY H. GROSSMAN, Denver, business manager of
elected president of the Central Jewish Aid Society.

DICTA,

has been re-

RALPH J. CUMMINGS, Denver, has been elected president of the University
of Denver Law School Alumni Association, to succeed THOMAS J. MORRISSEY. MAX D. MELVILLE is vice-president and FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW is

secretary-treasurer.
ALBERT J. GOULD, Denver, has been appointed to the national advisory board
of Stephens College.
Louis E. GELT has been elected president of the Denver District Zionist
Organization of America. Mr. Gelt held this position before going into the
army.
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M. SEARS, Denver,. has gone to Nuernberg to assist in the prosecution
of Nazi war criminals. Mr. Sears came to this country in 1939 when he
could not agree with Nazi war doctrines.
EDWIN

W. BLAKE, Denver, has been elected president of the Colorado Conference of Social Welfare, and JUDGE JOSEPH E. COOK, of the Denver
District Court, has been elected second vice-president.
CLAUDE

M. WEBSTER, former city councilman, and veteran of both World
wars, has been appointed by Governor Vivian to fill the vacancy in the Denver District Court created by the election of Judge Luxford to the Supreme
Court. Judge Webster is a member of the American Legion, Masons, Lions
Club and is secretary of the Denver County Central Committee of the Republican Party.
HAROLD

J. CHURCHILL OWEN of Denver, has been elected vice-president of the Colo,

rado Public Expenditure Council. Lawyer members of the board are
M. DAVIS, MONTGOMERY DORSEY, PETER H. HOLME, HOWARD S.
SON and RORERT S. GAST.

RICHARD
ROBERT-

M. DOWNING has been re-elected 2d vice-president of the Inter,
state Oil Compact Commission. Mr. Downing has represented Colorado
since the commission was organized in 1935.
WARWICK

A. WILDY, former Denver attorney, has returned here to head the
Denver office of the Secret Service, succeeding Rowland K. Goddard, who
has retired. Wildy is a graduate of the University of Denver Law School,
and has been in the government service since 1934.
EDGAR

Personals
C. DRINKWATER, former Denver wonder boy (wonder where he
is going to land next) has resigned as vice-president of American Air Lines
and has been elected president of Western Air Lines. Before going to the
American Air Lines, Terry was executive vice-president of Continental Air
Lines and was associated with Quigg Newton, Richard Davis and S. Arthur
Henry in the practice of law in Denver.
TERRELL

STANLEY H. JOHNSON and DONALD B. ROBERTSON, have formed a partnership under the name of Johnson & Robertson with offices at 704 E. & C.
Bldg., Denver. Johnson was formerly judge of the Juvenile and District
Courts in Denver and more recently trust officer of the International Trust
Company. Robertson has been engaged in private practice and is an attorney
for the Denver Tramway Corporation.

specializing in tax law and tax accounting, has
opened an office in the Security Life Bldg., Denver.

ROBERT S. ZIMMERMAN,

